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PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Pursuant to Rules 24(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
following is a complete list of all parties to the District Court proceedings that are the 
subject of this appeal, and their respective party designations in those proceedings: 
1. PIONEER BUILDERS COMPANY OF NEVADA, INC., a Nevada 
corporation a/k/a PIONEER BUILDERS OF NEVADA, a Nevada 
corporation a/k/a PIONEER BUILDERS, a Nevada corporation; Plaintiff 
2. KDA CORPORATION, a Utah corporation a/k/a KDA CORPORATION 
a/k/a K.D.A. CORPORATION a/k/a THE K.D.A. CORPORATION a/k/a 
K.D.A. CORPORATION PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah corporation; 
Defendant 
3. UNITED WEST INVESTMENTS GROUP, INC., a Utah corporation; 
Defendant 
4. S. DENISE HARDY; Defendant 
5. JOSEPH L. HARDY; Defendant 
6. DALE RIDD; Defendant 
7. MARTA RIDD; Defendant 
8. MARCEL J. SCHWAGER; Defendant 
9. SANDRA S. SCHWAGER; Defendant 
10. LYNN C. ANDERSEN, aka LYNN L. ANDERSEN, aka LYNN C. 
ANDERSON, aka LYNN L. ANDERSON; Defendant 
11. ROBERT GONZALES; Defendant 
12. SHERI GONZALES; Defendant 
13. MICHAEL BUDD; Defendant 
14. TRUDI BUDD; Defendant 
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15. HAROLD J. KAY; Defendant 
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17. LAURIE A. GLASER; Defendant 
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19. BRENT RHEES; Defendant 
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21. SHYREAL D. JENSEN; Defendant 
22. INGE L. JENSEN; Defendant 
23. JOHN D. SMIDT, trustee of the John D. Smidt and Linda L. Smidt 
Revocable Trust U/I/D October 7, 1999; Defendant 
24. LINDA L. SMIDT, trustee of the John D. Smidt and Linda L. Smidt 
Revocable Trust U/I/D October 7, 1999; Defendant 
25. THE JOHN D. SMIDT AND LINDA L. SMIDT REVOCABLE TRUST 
U/I/D OCTOBER 7, 1999; Defendant 
26. RANDALL HUNTER; Defendant 
27. RONALD HUNTER; Defendant 
28. KAY HUNTER; Defendant 
29. DANIEL HUNTER; Defendant 
30. MARK B. HANCEY; Defendant 
31. HANCEY & ASSOCIATES, P.C, a Utah professional corporation; 
Defendant 
32. ROD W. CUSHING dba ALLIANCE FINANCIAL, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company; Defendant 
33. CLINT THOMPSON; Defendant 
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52. THE BOYD A. and CAROLYN G. SMITH FAMILY TRUST; Defendant 
53. LARRY CALL; Defendant 
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57. JOHN F. GUNN; Defendant 
58. BECKY CUTLER-GUNN; Defendant 
59. JOHN L. WILLIAMSON; Defendant 
60. DAVE WARNICK; Defendant 
61. DEWEY GARNER; Defendant 
62. JASON THOMPSON; Defendant 
63. GLADE W. DAVIS; Defendant 
64. OWEN BROWER; Defendant 
65. SUNRISE VILLAGE MEMBERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah 
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66. NICTREE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a Utah limited partnership; 
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67. JOHN DOES I-XXX; and JANE DOES I-XXX; Defendants 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Section 78A-3-102 of the Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Whether the District Court erred in applying "inquiry notice" to rank 
priority of interests in real property, rather than the general default rule of record notice 
for determining priority in the order documents are recorded pursuant to Utah's recording 
statute. 
Standard of Review: This is a determination of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. Particularly, since the District Court decided this case on summary 
judgment, the appellate court must "review a trial court's summary judgment ruling for 
correctness and afford no deference to its legal conclusions." Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 
UT 95, If 5, 61 P.3d 989, 991 (quoting Utah Coal & Lumber v. Outdoor Endeavors 
Unlimited, 2001 UT 100, *{ 9, 40 P.3d 581) (internal quotations omitted). 
Demonstration that Issue No. 1 Was Preserved in the District Court: The 
applicability of inquiry notice was the central issue of the Defendants' cross-motions for 
summary judgment, and of Plaintiff s oppositions to those cross-motions. (E.g., R. 3632, 
R. 3639, R. 3670, R. 3677, R. 4146 - 4179, R. 4180 - 4205, and R. 4206 -4247). The 
issue also was the subject of various post-summary judgment objections and briefing, 
including a motion by Plaintiff for reconsideration. (E.g., R. 4738 - 4766, R. 4799 -
4803, R. 4813 - 4832, R. 4804 - 4812, R. 4844 - 4852, and R. 4865 - 4873). 
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Issue No. 2: Whether the District Court further erred in determining on the facts 
of this case that there was any duty for the Plaintiff below, now the Appellant Pioneer 
Builders Company of Nevada, Inc. ("Pioneer"), to inquire into the existence of any 
claimed interests in the subject real property beyond and outside of those reflected in the 
records of the county recorder, including by granting summary judgment to Defendants 
under an "inquiry notice" analysis where there were genuine disputes of material facts 
claimed as the bases for imposing a duty of "inquiry notice" upon Pioneer. 
Standard of Review: "Summary judgment is proper only when 'there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law.' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 'In determining whether the lower court 
correctly found that there was no genuine issue of material fact, we view the facts and 
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party.' In other 
words, 'we review the factual submissions to the District Court in a light most favorable 
to finding a material issue of fact.' Moreover, '[i]n reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment, we accord no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law and review them 
for correctness.'" Nyman v. McDonald, 966 P.2d 1210, 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(citations omitted). 
Demonstration that Issue No, 2 Was Preserved in the District Court: The 
presence of fact disputes material to the District Court's "inquiry notice" analysis, and 
thus precluding summary judgment for Defendants on inquiry notice, was a central issue 
briefed by Pioneer in opposition to the Defendants' cross-motions for summary 
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judgment. {E.g., R. 4180 - 4205 and R. 4206 - 4247). The presence of such material 
disputes of claimed inquiry notice facts also was the subject of various post-summary 
judgment objections and briefing, including a motion by Pioneer for reconsideration. 
{Kg., R. 4738 - 4766, R. 4799 - 4803, R. 4813 - 4832, R. 4804 - 4812, R. 4844 - 4852, 
and R. 4865 -4873). 
Issue No. 3: Whether the District Court erred in its interpretation, as a part of its 
"inquiry notice" analysis, of the language and effect of the deeds to the grantors of the 
trust deeds Pioneer seeks to foreclose in this case. 
Standard of Review: Interpretation of a deed is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness, unbound by and not subject to any presumption of correctness 
for the District Court's conclusions. Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979). 
Demonstration that Issue No, 3 Was Preserved in the District Court: The 
subject of Issue No. 3 was discussed as a part of Pioneer's opposition to the Budd 
Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment and in Pioneer's reply memorandum in 
support of ts own summary judgment motion (R. 4206-4247 and 4146-4179). That issue 
also was the subject of briefing in a post-summary judgment objection (R. 4738-4766). 
Issue No, 4: Whether the District Court erred in its interpretation and application 
of various documents and statutes as to their effect upon a certain parcel of the subject 
real property identified and referred to in the District Court proceedings (and in this brief) 
as "Parcel -025, including documents identified and referred to below in this brief as 
4850-4696-9353 3 
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Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed, Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed, Corrective 
Affidavit, and Settlement Deed, and Utah statutes expressly providing for corrective 
affidavits and for retroactive application of after-acquired title. 
Standard of Review: Interpretation of real estate documents and statutory 
interpretation both present questions of law which are reviewed for correctness, with no 
presumption of correctness for the District Court's interpretation. Hartman v. Potter, 596 
P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979); Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,1J17, 977 P.2d 
1201,1203. 
Demonstration that Issue No. 4 Was Preserved in the District Court: The 
subjects of Issue No. 4 were discussed in Pioneer's oppositions to Defendants' cross-
motions for summary judgment and in Pioneer's reply memorandum in support of its 
own motion for summary judgment. (R. 4206-4247 and 4146-4179.) 
Issue No. 5: Whether the District Court erred in granting priority to certain of the 
Filing Defendants who admittedly had not paid their contracts in full, where the face and 
plain language of their contracts expressly and indisputably provided that they would not 
obtain any interest in any property until they paid in full. 
Standard of Review: This is a determination of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. Particularly, since the District Court decided this case on summary 
judgment, the appellate court must "review a trial court's summary judgment ruling for 
correctness and afford no deference to its legal conclusions." Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 
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UT 95,1| 5, 61 P.3d 989, 991 (quoting Utah Coal & Lumber v. Outdoor Endeavors 
Unlimited, 2001 UT 100, \ 9, 40 P.3d 581 ) (internal quotations omitted). 
Demonstration that Issue No. 5 Was Preserved in the District Court: The 
subject of Issue No. 5 was discussed in briefing on post-summary judgment objections, 
and in connection with a further motion as to issues pertaining to "Payment Lots" as that 
term is hereinafter defined. (R. 4738-4766 and 5272-5278.) 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
The following controlling statutes are applicable to this appeal: 
Utah Code § 57-3-102(1) (2005): 
Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, or certified copy of a 
document complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each 
copy of a notice of location complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing 
statement complying with Section 70A-9a-502, whether or not acknowledged, 
shall, from the time of recording with the appropriate county recorder, impact 
notice to all persons of their contents. 
Utah Code § 57-3-103(2) (2005): 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a 
valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
Utah Code § 57-1-20 (2006): 
Transfers in trust of real property may be made to secure the performance of an 
obligation of the trustor or any other person named in the trust deed to a 
beneficiary. All right, title, interest and claim in and to the trust property 
acquired by the trustor, or the trustor's successors in interest, subsequent to the 
execution of the trust deed, shall inure to the trustee as security for the 
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obligation or obligations for which the trust property is conveyed as if acquired 
before execution of the trust deed. 
Utah Code § 57-3-106(8) (2006): 
Minor typographical or clerical errors in a document of record may be 
corrected by the recording of an affidavit or other appropriate instrument. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from various summary judgment rulings as to the priority of certain 
interests claimed in various parts and portions of an approximately 40-acre parcel of real 
property being developed as an RV park (the "Property") near Bear Lake, in Rich 
County, Utah. 
Pioneer filed this case seeking, principally, to foreclose upon three trust deeds 
encumbering the Property (collectively, "Pioneer's Trust Deeds"). (See Complaints and 
Amended Complaints at R. 3, 63, 582, and 2629.) Pioneer's Trust Deeds were pledged as 
collateral for loans extended by Pioneer to the developers of the RV park property in the 
total principal amount of $1,150,000.00. Pioneer filed a motion for summary judgment 
("Pioneer's Summary Judgment Motion") to foreclose its Trust Deeds as against the 
developers' interests in the overall 40-acre Property and the interests of numerous other 
defendants to various individual pads, lots, units, easements and other parts or interests 
within the overall 40-acre Property. (R. 2962, 2965, and 2985.) 
Out of all of the defendants named in the case, only two limited groups of them 
opposed Pioneer's Summary Judgment Motion (which groups were referred to in the 
District Court briefing, and are referred to hereinafter, as the "Anderson Defendants" 
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and the "Budd Defendants," respectively, and are occasionally referred to hereinafter 
collectively as the "Filing Defendants"). Those Filing Defendants each claimed various 
leasehold, membership, and easement interests in or pertaining to various individual 
subdivided pads, lots, or units within the overall 40-acre Property, for seasonal 
recreational use, including for parking and hookup of recreational vehicles. 
Pioneer's Trust Deeds indisputably were recorded before any of the Filing 
Defendants recorded any documents evidencing any of the Filing Defendants' claimed 
interests. As a matter of law, therefore, the Filing Defendants' claims and interests are all 
junior and inferior to, and subject to foreclosure by, Pioneer's Trust Deeds pursuant to 
Utah's recording statute, which was the basis for Pioneer's Summary Judgment Motion. 
The Defendants, however, each filed cross-motions for summary judgment with their 
oppositions to Pioneer's Summary Judgment Motion (collectively, "Filing Defendants9 
Summary Judgment Cross-Motions"). (E.g., R. 3632, 3639, 3670, and 3677.) They 
argued they actually had priority over Pioneer's Trust Deeds because Pioneer purportedly 
was on "inquiry notice" of the Defendants' claimed, but admittedly unrecorded, interests 
before Pioneer recorded its Trust Deeds. They argued that Pioneer had a duty to conduct 
some unspecified inquiry outside of and beyond the country records looking for their 
unrecorded interests, that inquiry would have led Pioneer to learn of their unrecorded 
interests, that Pioneer therefore is deemed to have been on notice of the existence of their 
unrecorded interests, and thus that Pioneer's Trust Deeds are actually junior, subject, and 
inferior to the Defendants' interests that admittedly were not of record when Pioneer 
recorded its Trust Deeds. 
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On May 10, 2007, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision (R. 4366 -
4388 (the "Initial Decision55)), granting Pioneer's Summary Judgment Motion in part, 
ruling the loans Pioneer made were in default, that Pioneer was owed on those loans the 
amounts and items specified by Pioneer, and that Pioneer was entitled to foreclose its 
Trust Deeds as against some of the interests of some of the parties to some of the various 
individual subdivided pads, lots, or units within the overall 40-acre Property based on 
record notice priority. (Id. at R. 4385.) 
The District Court's Initial Decision, however, also granted both of the 
Defendants' Summary Judgment Cross-Motions. Despite Pioneer's disputes of the 
material facts relied upon by the District Court as the bases for applying it, and despite 
those facts being insufficient as a matter of law in any event to apply it, the District Court 
ruled that Pioneer was charged with "inquiry notice55 of the interests of the filing 
Defendants, and therefore that Pioneer's Trust Deeds "are inferior to the property 
interests of these [Filing] Defendants" and further that Pioneer's "foreclosure shall be 
subject to all interests claimed by the [Filing] Defendants as leaseholders and right of 
way holders as set forth in this [Initial] Decision." (Id.) 
The Anderson Defendants circulated various proposed judgments to embody the 
inquiry notice ruling of the District Court's Initial Decision. (E.g., R.4611,4555, and 
4890.) Pioneer filed various objections to the proposed judgments, including addressing 
issues affecting priority of a certain handful of individual lots based on their location (the 
"Location Lots") and issues affecting priority of certain other lots based on whether the 
parties claiming them had paid for them (the "Payment Lots"). (E.g} R. 4442, 4583, and 
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4804.) After extensive briefing on the objections by all affected parties, and a hearing 
held before the District Court on March 20, 2008, the District Court issued a new 
Memorandum Decision on March 26, 2008 (R. 4776 - 4782( the "March 2008 
Memorandum Decision")). 
In its March 2008 Memorandum Decision the District Court retreated from the 
inquiry notice theory it had previously used for all Filing Defendants, and ruled that the 
interests of claimants to the Location Lots actually could be junior to and subject to 
foreclosure by Pioneer's Trust Deeds after all, depending on whether they were located in 
one certain parcel of the Property rather than another, based on record notice priority of 
Pioneer's Trust Deeds on one of those parcels pursuant to Utah's recording statute. 
Over Pioneer's objection (R. 4804 - 4812), and despite Pioneer's motion for 
reconsideration of the Initial Decision's application of inquiry notice in light of the 
March 2008 Memorandum Decision recognizing the primacy of record notice (R. 4799, 
4813, 4844, and 4883), on January 6, 2009 the District Court entered what was captioned 
as the Second Corrected Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and Order Granting 
Motions for Summary Judgment and Order Pursuant to the Court's December 10, 2008 
Memorandum Decision (identified and referred to in this brief as the "January 2009 
Judgment and Order" (R. 4906-4919). The January 2009 Judgment and Order applied 
inquiry notice priority as to most of the Filing Defendants, but expressly reserved priority 
as to the Location Lots to be determined based on record notice (R. 4916-4917). 
Eventually, the District Court ruled the Location Lots were indeed located in one 
certain parcel of the Property, so it entered an Updated Order and Judgment of Priority 
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and Foreclosure of Location Lots on December 16, 2009 (identified and referred to 
below in this brief as the "December 2009 Judgment on Location Lots" (R. 5079), 
applying statutory record notice priority as to the Location Lots. The decisions 
recognizing the primacy of Utah's recording statute over and instead of inquiry notice as 
to that small group within the group Filing Defendants claiming interests in the Location 
Lots were correct and have not been challenged by any party so they are final. But they 
highlight the impropriety of applying inquiry notice instead to govern the priority of all of 
the other Filing Defendants. 
The January 2009 Judgment and Order also indicated the interests of certain of the 
Filing Defendants in the Payment Lots "is subject to further hearing to determine which 
of the [Payment] Lots have been fully paid for, to what extent payment has or has not 
been rendered and ultimately what affect [sic] the foregoing Defendants' payments (in 
full or in part) or the lack thereof have on the foregoing Defendants' priorities." (R. 
4917.) In a further motion for judgment as to the priority of the Payment Lots, Pioneer 
showed the contracts for the claimants' interests in those lots expressly required payment 
in full before those claimants would even become entitled to any interest in any of the 
Payment Lots, and that none of the claimants to any of those lots, by their own 
admissions, had paid off their contract in full. {E.g. R. 5126, 5132, and 5272.) 
The District Court ultimately held that notwithstanding that contractual language, 
and notwithstanding those Defendants' admitted failure to pay in full under their 
contracts, these Defendants nevertheless had priority over Pioneer's Trust Deeds based 
on the inquiry notice theory under its January 2009 Judgment and Order. {Order 
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Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment of Priority Over Certain l<Payment Lots " 
Pursuant to the Court's 2009 Judgment and Order entered on August 24, 2010, identified 
and referred to in this brief as the "August 2010 Judgment on Payment Lots".) (R. 
5323-5329). 
The January 2009 Judgment and Order, the December 2009 Judgment on Location 
Lots, and the August 2010 Judgment on Payment Lots are occasionally referred to 
hereinafter collectively as the "Foreclosure-Related Rulings and Judgments," and all 
have been certified as final for this appeal in and by an Order Certifying as Final Under 
Rule 54(b) the Foreclosure-Related Rulings and Judgments, entered December 14, 2010. 
(R. 5408-5444). That certification order, together with the copies of the Foreclosure-
Related Rulings and Judgments that were attached to it and which it certified as final for 
appeal, is all attached hereto collectively as Addendum 4. The Initial Decision, the 
March 2008 Memorandum Decision and the December 2008 Memorandum Decision 
leading up to the entry of the Foreclosure-Related Rulings and Judgments also are 
attached hereto, as Addenda 1, 2 and 3, respectively. 
There was no dispute below, nor is there any question in this appeal, that the 
promissory notes to Pioneer for which Pioneer's Trust Deeds serve as security are in 
default, as to the amounts due and owing under them to Pioneer, nor as to Pioneer's 
general right to foreclose. It is the District Court's decision applying inquiry notice as to 
the priority of Pioneer's Trust Deeds that is the core subject of this appeal. Pioneer 
appeals the District Court's erroneous and inconsistent rulings as to applicability at all of 
inquiry notice in and to this case, as a matter of law, rather than the general default rule of 
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record notice priority pursuant to Utah's recording statute which instead should govern 
this case. Pioneer further appeals the District Court's improper grant of summary 
judgment imposing inquiry notice where the facts claimed as the basis for application of 
that theory were disputed. Pioneer also appeals the District Court's determinations as to 
the language and effect of certain deeds and other documents and statutes that contributed 
to the erroneous application of inquiry notice in this case. 
This Court should reverse the District Court, declare as a matter of law that record 
notice priority should be uniformly applied to all of the interests of all of the parties to 
this case, and declare Pioneer's Trust Deeds therefore indisputably are prior and superior 
as a matter of law to all interests of all defendants in all of the Property. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Record Priority Facts 
1. On November 17, 2000, Pioneer caused to be recorded in the office of the 
Rich County Recorder a "Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents" of which Pioneer was 
the beneficiary ("Pioneer's First Trust Deed"), which was granted as security for a loan 
Pioneer had made in the principal sum of Nine Hundred Thousand Dollars ($900,000.00). 
(January 2009 Judgment and Order at fflf 2 & 3 (R. 5416-5418) included in Addendum 4 
hereto). A certified copy of Pioneer's First Trust Deed was attached to Pioneer's 
Summary Judgment Memo as an exhibit at R. 3006-3014, a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Addendum 5. 
2. On August 14, 2001, Pioneer caused to be recorded in the office of the Rich 
County Recorder two additional trust deeds, one entitled "Modification of Trust Deed" 
("Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed"), and one entitled "Trust Deed with Assignment of 
Rents" ("Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed"), each of which was granted as security 
for Pioneer's loan of additional funds in the total principal face amount of One Million 
Five Hundred and Ten Thousand Dollars ($1,510,000.00).* (January 2009 Judgment and 
Order at fflf 2-4 (R. 5416-5418) included in Addendum 4 hereto). Certified copies of 
Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and of Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed were attached 
The August 2001 loan was for "new money" in the amount of Eight Hundred Thousand 
Dollars ($800,000.00) on top of and in addition to the amounts that remained owing at 
that time on the first loan mentioned above, for a total cumulative outstanding loan 
balance of One Million Five Hundred and Ten Thousand Dollars ($1,510,000.00). 
(January 2009 Judgment and Order at ^ 4 (R. 5418) included in Addendum No. 4 hereto). 
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to Pioneer's Summary Judgment Memo as exhibits at R. 3020-3028 and R. 3030-3038, 
respectively, copies of which are attached hereto as Addendum Nos. 6 and 7. 
3. Pioneer's First Trust Deed on its face expressly included and described 
three parcels of real property in Rich County, Utah, respectively bearing Rich County 
Tax Identification Nos. 41-08-00-036, 41-08-00-037, and 41-08-00-038. (January 2009 
Judgment and Order at fflf 2 & 3 (R. 5416-5418) included in Addendum 4 hereto; see also 
Pioneer's First Trust Deed attached hereto as Addendum 5). 
4. Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed 
each on their faces expressly included and described the same three parcels of real 
property that were included and described in Pioneer'-s First Trust Deed, and also an 
additional fourth parcel of property in Rich County, Utah, bearing Rich County Tax 
Identification No. 41-08-00-025 (hereinafter, "Parcel -025"). (January 2009 Judgment 
and Order at fflf 2-4 (R. 5416-5418) included in Addendum 4 hereto; see also Pioneer's 
Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed attached hereto as 
Addendum Nos. 6 and 7, respectively). 
5. Indisputably, none of the defendants in this case recorded with the Rich 
County Recorder's Office any documents evidencing their respectively-claimed interests 
in any part or portion of the overall 40-acre Property that is the subject of this case until 
after Pioneer's Trust Deeds were recorded (and some of the defendants never recorded 
their claimed interests at all even up to the time Pioneer filed its summary judgment 
motion in this case). Attached hereto as Addendum 8 is a table showing the individuals 
and entities who are named as defendants in this case and the documents recorded by 
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them in the office of the Rich County Recorder, on the dates noted, evidencing their 
respective claims and interests in and to various portions of the Property. Certified 
copies of each of the recorded documents referenced in that table were attached to 
Pioneer's Summary Judgment Memo collectively as an exhibit (at R. 3040-3195), 
additional copies of which are attached hereto collectively as Addendum 9. 
Claimed Facts Relied Upon for Inquiry Notice Ruling 
6. In contravention of the indisputable record notice priority of Pioneer's 
Trust Deeds, the Filing Defendants argued and the District Court held that Pioneer 
purportedly was on "inquiry notice" of (and therefore the Pioneer Trust Deeds were 
junior to) the Filing Defendants' claims and interests, because at the time Pioneer's Trust 
Deeds were recorded: 
a. The portions of the Property on which Filing Defendants claimed an 
interest were a part of larger tracts making up the entire Property which had been 
platted essentially for subdivision and overall development with multiple lot 
owners or leaseholders, with RV park regulations, articles of incorporation and 
bylaws, having been recorded for the overall 40-acre Property as far back as 1988. 
(Initial Decision, at ffif 1 & 5 (R. 4367 and 4370) included as Addendum lhereto); 
see also exhibits 47 and 48 of the Anderson Defendants' Exhibits to Reply in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and In Support of 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (filed in two parts, beginning, 
respectively at R. 3240 and R. 3417). 
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b. "Several leasehold interests ([of people who are not parties to this 
case] virtually identical to those of the [Filing] Defendants, except on different 
Lots) were recorded prior to the recording of the Pioneer trust deeds." (Initial 
Decision, Tf 4 (R. 4369) included as Addendum lhereto). 
c. "Prior to recording any of the Pioneer trust deeds; Pioneer, or its 
agents, had knowledge that KDA had leased many of the sites in the Recreational 
Vehicle (RV) Park/' (Initial Decision, H 17 (R. 4372)), which conclusion appeared 
to be based upon the District Court's statements that an appraisal allegedly "was 
commissioned by Steve Baugh to induce Ralph Call, president of Pioneer, and 
brother-in-law of Steve Baugh, to finance United West's purchase of the • 
properties," which allegedly "included descriptions of leaseholds that had been 
sold to various people (Initial Decision, fflf 7 and 16 (R. 4370 and 4372)). 
d. "Prior to the recording of [Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and 
Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed on August 14, 2001,] which pledges the 
property in which most of these Defendants claim an interest (ID #025), 
Defendants were in possession of and made improvements to their leased property, 
including concrete pads, fences, posts, parking, gravel driveways, power meters, 
planted trees, flowers and gardens, sprinkler systems, lawns, landscaping, patio 
furniture, a fire pit, family signs, among others [the others noted by the District 
Court were a storage shed on one lot, a rock wall on one lot and installing stairs, a 
water hook up and sewer line on two lots]. There were individual Utah Power and 
Light meters to each lot and recreational vehicles parked on the leased properties." 
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(Initial Decision, 118 (R. 4373) included as Addendum 1 hereto; id, 1fl[ 6, 25, 26 
& 27 (R. 4370, and R. 4374). 
e. "In approximately April of 2001, Ralph Call and Steve Baugh 
personally visited the property, giving Pioneer actual knowledge of the 
Defendants' uses and improvements of the property to the extent these were 
visible." (Initial Decision, ^ 21 (R. 4373) included as Addendum 1 hereto). 
f. After August 14, 2001, but prior to September 24, 2002, various of 
the defendants had made substantial and open use of and improvements to their 
lots. (Initial Decision, ffif 36, 37, 38 (R. 4376-4377) included as Addendum 1 
hereto). * 
7. There were disputes of facts that were material to the District Court's 
inquiry notice analysis and ruling, thus precluding summary judgment for Defendants on 
their summary judgment motions, including: 
a. The District Court's statement that a certain appraisal "was 
commissioned by Steve Baugh to induce Ralph Call, president of Pioneer, and 
brother-in-law of Steve Baugh, to finance United West's purchase of the 
properties" (see fact paragraph 6.c. hereinabove), was nearly a verbatim quote of 
paragraph 3 of the Budd Defendants' memorandum filed in support of their 
summary judgment cross-motion in which the Budd Defendants further argued 
that Steve Baugh was an agent of Ralph Call, the principal of Pioneer. (R. 3677.) 
In Pioneer's memorandum opposing the Budd Defendants' cross-motion, 
however, responding to the Budd Defendants' paragraph 3 and agency claim in the 
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Budd Defendants' paragraph 24, Pioneer expressly stated, among other things (R. 
4206): 
Pioneer disputes and denies that Steve Baugh ("Baugh") was or has 
ever been its agent, or Ralph Call's agent, for or relating in any way to 
any of the transactions that are the subject of this case. The sworn Call 
Affidavit being filed with the Court and the sworn Affidavit of Steve 
Baugh (the "Baugh Affidavit") also being filed with the Court, both 
clearly and emphatically state and confirm that Baugh has never been 
hired nor otherwise authorized to act as any agent or other representative 
of Pioneer in any way or capacity, including not relating or pertaining in 
any way to any of the Pioneer loans that are the subject of this case. 
(Call Affidavit, 13 , Addendum 15; Baugh Affidavit, ^ 3, Addendum 16). 
Pioneer also disputes and denies that the appraisal referenced in 
Budd Parties' Claimed Fact fflf 3 and 24 was commissioned to induce 
Pioneer to make any loans, and further disputes and denies that Ralph 
Call read the appraisal report before Pioneer made its loans that are the 
subject of this case. The Call and Baugh affidavits being filed herewith 
both directly state and confirm that Pioneer did not commission, request, 
authorize, or even know about the appraisal report being ordered or 
commissioned by Baugh. (Call Affidavit, f^ 6, Addendum 15; Baugh 
Affidavit fflf 4-6, Addendum 16). 
The Anderson Defendants also claimed in fact paragraphs 6 and 8 of their 
summary judgment memorandum that Baugh was an agent of Pioneer with 
authority to act for Pioneer. (R. 3639.) Pioneer also expressly disputed and 
denied that claimed agency in its response to paragraphs 6 and 8 in its 
memorandum opposing the Anderson Defendants' summary judgment cross-
motion precisely the same as set forth in the first block-quoted paragraph above. 
(R.4180). 
b. The District Court's references to the purported facts as to any actual 
notice based upon an appraisal report (fact paragraph 6.c. above) before Pioneer's 
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first loan in November 2000, were drawn from paragraphs 3 and 24 of the Budd 
Defendants' memorandum filed in support of their summary judgment cross-
motion, and paragraph 7 of the Anderson Defendants' memorandum filed in 
support of their summary judgment cross-motion, which memoranda appear at R. 
3677 and R. 3639, respectively. In Pioneer's memoranda opposing those cross-
motions (R. 4206 and 4180), however, responding to the Budd Defendants' 
paragraphs 3 and 24 and the Anderson Defendants' paragraph 7, Pioneer expressly 
disputed those claimed facts as follows: 
Pioneer further disputes and denies ... that Pioneer's president, Call, 
read the referenced appraisal before Pioneer making any loans. Indeed, 
the body of the appraisal itself is dated December 29, 2000, more than a 
month after Pioneer's first loan was made. Moreover, when Baugh 
received the appraisal, sometime after December 29, 2000, he forwarded 
to Call only two pages of it without all of the lease information and 
other detail the Budd Parties refer to and rely upon in their claimed fact 
fflf 3 and 24. (Call Affidavit, ^ 6, Addendum 15; Baugh Affidavit, fflf 4-
8, Addendum 16). 
Pioneer disputes and denies Budd Parties' Claimed Fact ^ 3 and 24 
that Pioneer had actual notice of existing leasehold interests and current 
sales prior to making any loans on the property, including since that 
claim actually is a conclusion drawn by the Budd Parties from its other 
fact claims set forth in its fflj 3 and 24, all of which as shown above are 
disputed by Pioneer. 
(Emphasis added). 
c. In the very same Initial Decision in which the District Court stated 
that "[i]n approximately April of 2001, Ralph Call and Steve Baugh personally 
visited the property, giving Pioneer actual knowledge of the Defendants' uses and 
improvements of the property to the extent these were visible" (see fact paragraph 
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6.e. above), the District Court itself acknowledged that "Plaintiff disputes that it 
had inquiry notice of the existence of the purported improvements and disputes 
any actual knowledge of these claimed improvements." (R. 4381) (emphasis 
added). It nevertheless still entered summary judgment for Filing Defendants 
based on inquiry notice despite those acknowledged disputes of material facts. 
Those purported actual knowledge facts mentioned by the District Court were 
drawn from paragraph 10 of the Budd Defendants' memorandum filed in support 
oftheir summary judgment cross-motion. (R. 3677). In Pioneer's memorandum 
opposing the Budd Defendants' cross-motion, however, responding to the Budd 
Defendants' paragraph 10, Pioneer expressly stated, among other things, that 
Pioneer disputes the purported agencies (including without limitation as noted 
above), and (R. 4206): 
... Pioneer disputes the portions of Budd Parties' Claimed Fact f 10 
claiming Pioneer somehow had "actual knowledge of Defendant 
Taylors' use and improvement of parcel -025, and ongoing sales of RV 
sites on parcel -025 to new defendants" based upon that visit to the 
subject property, as claimed by the Budd Parties. As stated in Call's 
sworn affidavit, all he saw with regard to any use or improvements on 
any of the subject property was "[a]t most there were four or five 
recreational vehicle camper trailers parked in various spots [,] a few 
concrete slabs in scattered places[,] a lodge on the property, and some 
small, narrow roads." (Call Affidavit, ^ 8, Addendum 15). 
(Emphasis added). 
Other Relevant Facts and Documents 
8. The District Court held "Plaintiff obtained its trust deed interests in the 
Property subject to the restrictions appearing in the owners' warranty deed restrictions, 
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including making the interests 'subject to all... easements, agreements, memberships, 
[and] leases.'" (January 2009 Judgment and Order, If 13.d. (R. 5422) included in 
Addendum 4.) 
9. The actual "subject to" clause language in each of the deeds to the grantors 
of Pioneer's Trust Deeds was: 
Subject to all declarations, covenants, conditions and restrictions, 
certificate of beneficial use, regulations, canals, greenbelt provisions, 
easements, declarations, agreements, memberships, leases and rights of 
way of record. 
(Certified copies of the deeds to the grantors of Pioneer's Trust Deeds were attached to 
Pioneer's Summary Judgment Memo and Pioneer's Reply Memo as exhibits (at R. 3016-
3016 and R. 4178-4179), copies of which are attached hereto as Addenda 10 and 11, 
respectively (emphasis added). 
10. The deed to the entity that became trustor of Pioneer's First Trust Deed 
conveyed to that grantor all three of the parcels which were then described in Pioneer's 
First Trust Deed (specifically, Rich County tax ID numbers 41-08-00-036, 41-08-00-037 
and 41 -08-00-03 8). (Addendum 5 hereto.) 
11. As it was recorded, the deed to the entity that then became trustor of 
Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed, appeared to 
describe on its face only three of the four parcels that entity then described and pledged in 
Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed. Specifically, the 
deed to the entity that then became trustor of Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and 
Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed, as recorded, described and included Rich County tax 
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ID numbers 41-08-00-0365 41-08-00-037 and 41-08-00-038, but did not, as recorded, 
expressly identify Parcel -025 that was also included with those three parcels in Pioneer's 
Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed. {Compare Addendum 11 
with Addenda 6 and 7.) 
12. There was recorded in the office of the Rich County Recorder on 
September 24, 2002, by an employee of Advanced Title who handled the closing on the 
transaction involving the conveyance to the grantor of Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed 
and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust deed and its granting of those trust deeds, an "Affidavit 
Concerning Recorded Instruments" (the "Corrective Affidavit") which expressly states , 
that Parcel -025 "was included in the transaction between the parties ... and should have 
been included in the legal description attached to" the deed to the grantor of Modified 
Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed attaching legal description pages. 
{See Initial Decision, ^ f 39 (R. 4377, Addendum 1) A certified copy of the Corrective 
Affidavit was attached as an exhibit to Pioneer's summary judgment reply memo at R. < 
4172, and a copy of it is attached as Addendum 12 hereto.) 
13. As the Budd Defendants themselves pointed out, and the District Court 
ruled, the Purchase and Sale Agreement between the prior owner of the Property (an 
entity referred to in the District Court as KDA) and the party to whom it sold the 
Property, to whom Pioneer made some of its loans and who signed Pioneer's Modified 
Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed (an entity referred to in the District 
Court as Pine Ridge), expressly listed Parcel -025 as among the parcels that KDA agreed ^ 
to convey and Pine Ridge agreed and contracted to buy. (Initial Decision, ^ 23 (R. 4373, 
4850-4696-9353 0"» 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Addendum 1); see also exhibit 7 to Budd Defendants' initial summary judgment 
memorandum beginning at R. 3677). 
14. Nevertheless, the District Court ruled the Corrective Affidavit "is a nullity, 
is not retroactive, and does not meet the requirements of § 57-3-106(8) UCA." (January 
2009 Judgment and Order, ^ 13.e., at R. 5422, included in Addendum 4 hereto). 
15. The District Court stated that, prior to the recording of the Corrective 
Affidavit, "Plaintiff failed to record parcel -025 in its Modified Pioneer Trust Deed filing. 
After the failure to include parcel -025, improvements were made to lots in parcel -025 
between the time the leaseholds were purchased (which were after the Modified Pioneer 
Trust Deed was recorded and the time of the correction filing," and "Plaintiffs Modified 
Pioneer Trust Deed filing and corrective filing fails to put Plaintiff in a superior position 
to [Filing] Defendants." (Initial Decision, at R. 4384-4385, Addendum 1 hereto). 
16. The District Court itself, however, had already acknowledged earlier in its 
Initial Decision (and it later confirmed in its January 2009 Judgment and Order), that 
Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed expressly does include, identify, and list Parcel -025 
among the Property affected by it. (Initial Decision, ^ 33.a., at R. 4375 - 4376, 
Addendum 1 hereto; January 2009 Judgment and Order, fflj 2 & 3, at R. 5417-5418, 
included in Addendum 4 hereto; see also Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed, Addendum 6 
hereto). 
17. Additionally, the District Court also recognized that Pioneer's 
Supplemental Trust Deed that was recorded the same day as Prioneer's Modified Trust 
Deed in any event also expressly included, identified, and listed Parcel -025 among the 
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Property affected by it. (Initial Decision, % 33.a., at R. 4375 - 4376; January 2009 
Judgment and Order, ffif 2-4, at R. 5417-5418, included in Addendum 4 hereto; Pioneer's 
Modified Trust Deed, Addendum 6 hereto). 
18. It is undisputed that, as a part of a settlement of part of this case, an 
additional deed was executed to confirm and unequivocally convey the Property, 
including Parcel -025, to the grantor of Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's 
Supplemental Trust Deed (the "Settlement Deed"). A certified copy of that Settlement 
Deed was attached to Pioneer's summary judgment reply memo as an exhibit at R. 4174-
4176, and a copy of it is included as Addendum 13 hereto. 
19. The January 2009 Judgment and Order expressly left open the priority 
determination as to some of the Filing Defendants who claimed interests in certain lots 
identified in the District Court proceedings, and in this brief, as the Payment Lots. 
(January 2009 Judgment and Order, f 21 at R. 5427, attached as a part of Addendum 4 
hereto). 
20. The documents under which the claimants to the Payment Lots contracted 
for their respective interests in those lots each indisputably stated that those parties "shall 
receive a certificate of ownership when contract is paid in full." (August 2010 Judgment 
on Payment Lots, ^ 3 at R. 5440 included in Addendum 4 hereto; see also e.g., p. ix (at R. 
5140) ofMemorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Judgment of Priority Over 
Certain u Payment Lots " Pursuant to the Court's January 2009 Judgment and Order). 
21. Each of the claimants to each of the Payment Lots indisputably admitted in 
sworn deposition testimony that their respective contracts had not been paid in full. 
4850-4696-9353 OA 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(August 2010 Judgment on Payment Lots, <|[ 4 at R. 5440 included in Addendum 4 hereto; 
see also e.g., id. at pp. viii-ix (at R. 5139 - 5140)). 
22. Citing back to and relying upon the inquiry notice analysis of its January 
2009 Judgment and Order, however, the District Court ultimately held the interest of the 
claimants to the Payment Lots "were prior in right to any interest or claim of Plaintiff 
because Plaintiff did not purport to obtain title to what has been referred to herein as 
Parcel -025 until [the Corrective Affidavit] on September 24, 2002." (August 2010 
Judgment on Payment Lots, at R. 5441 included in Addendum 4 hereto). 
23. The Anderson Defendants and the Budd Defendants each referred in their 
summary judgment memoranda, as a part of their inquiry notice argument, to the 
existence of title insurance held by Pioneer. For example, the Anderson Defendants 
argued that Pioneer was had constructive notice of recorded leases "reflected in a title 
commitment and policy" (at R. 3650), and the Budd Defendants argued Pioneer's 
"recourse lies in an action against the trustor personally, and with the title company who 
insured the property." (at R. 3695). 
24. Pioneer objected to and moved to strike the references to title insurance 
(e.g., at R. 4709 & R. 4201), to no avail. 
Attorney Fees 
25. The promissory notes for which Pioneer's Trust Deeds were granted as 
security each expressly provided that the obligors were obligated to pay and Pioneer is 
entitled to recover (including through foreclosure as against the Property) all costs and 
expenses of collection, including without limitation reasonable attorney fees. (See e.g., 
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R. 2985 Affidavit of Ralph Call, fflf 3 & 4 and its Exhibits "A" and "B", R. 2989 and R. 
2991, copies of all of which are attached hereto as a part of Addendum 14; see also e.g., 
R. 2965, f 16 of Pioneer's Summary Judgment Memo, undisputed in pointing out 
Pioneer's entitlement under its promissory notes to recover all costs and expenses of 
collection, including attorney fees). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Pioneer's Summary Judgment Motion sought simply to foreclose on real property 
based upon the indisputable record priority of Pioneer's Trust Deeds as against the later 
(and in some cases never) recorded interests of defendants in various parts of the 
Property. There were no disputes as to any material facts on Pioneer's Summary 
Judgment Motion. Indeed, the Filing Defendants admitted the relevant and dispositive 
facts of this case: that Pioneer's Trust Deeds securing its loans were recorded on the 
Property before any of the Filing Defendants recorded any documents relating to any of 
their claimed interests. Since they indisputably were recorded first, pursuant to Utah's 
recording statute Pioneer's Trust Deeds are prior and superior as a matter of law to any 
interests claimed by Filing Defendants in any of the Property. 
The District Court, however, erroneously applied an "inquiry notice" analysis to 
this case. Record notice pursuant to Utah's recording statute is the default rule for 
ranking priority of interests in real property, including because it is objection and easily 
verifiable. Inquiry notice is a rare exception to record notice. It is well-settled that facts 
and circumstances that are not inconsistent with or adverse to what appears in the 
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documents of record do not give rise to any duty to inquire beyond the face of the county 
recorder's records nor otherwise upset the default rule of record notice priority. None of 
the factors claimed by Filing Defendants and relied upon by the District Court in support 
of the inquiry notice analysis were inconsistent with what one would expect to see with 
regard to property like that at issue in this case. As a matter of law, therefore, those 
factors cannot give rise to any duty to inquire beyond the record looking for interests of 
parties who failed to record. The District Court therefore erred in concluding otherwise, 
and applying inquiry notice to the case at bar. The District Court's inquiry notice ruling 
is unsupported by, and indeed contrary to, applicable inquiry notice case law. If upheld 
on the claimed facts of this case, the District Court's ruling imposing a duty to inquire 
beyond the recorded documents would have a profoundly negative and destabilizing 
impact on the real property secured lending industry. This Court should reverse the 
District Court's application of inquiry notice to this case as a matter of law. 
The District Court further erred in any event by granting Filing Defendants' 
Summary Judgment Cross-Motions imposing inquiry notice because there were disputes 
of facts claimed by Defendants and relied upon by the District Court in support of and 
material to the inquiry notice analysis. The existence of disputes of fact precluded any 
grant of Defendants' Summary Judgment Cross-Motions finding or imposing any duty of 
Pioneer to inquire beyond the records of the Rich County Recorder's Office, and further 
compel a reversal of the District Court's rulings applying inquiry notice. 
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The District Court also erred in other portions of its inquiry notice analysis, 
including in its interpretation of the language in and other content and effect of various 
recorded documents and statutes. 
This Court should follow and apply Utah's recording statute, reverse the District 
Court's erroneous and improper application of inquiry notice to this case, and rule that 
Pioneer's Trust Deeds are prior and superior, as a matter of law, to the interests of all 
other parties to this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING INQUIRY NOTICE AS 
GOVERNING PRIORITY IN THIS CASE, RATHER THAN RECORD 
NOTICE PURSUANT TO UTAH'S RECORDING STATUTE 
This Court should reverse the District Court's erroneous application of inquiry 
notice to this case. Even if they were undisputed (which they were not, as discussed in 
Argument II below), the facts relied upon by the District Court were insufficient as a 
matter of law to impose any duty to make any inquiry in addition to or beyond the 
documents recorded in the Rich County Recorder's Office. 
For determining the priority of interests in real property, the Utah Legislature has 
enacted a recording statute which, as a matter of law, codifies the rule of "first in time, 
first in right." Pursuant to Utah's recording statute, priority is determined according to 
the order in which competing interests were recorded, with the first-recorded interest 
having priority. E.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-3-102(1) & -103(2) (2005) (providing that 
immediately from the time of recording of a document in the county recorder's office 
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such document provides notice of its contents to all persons, and that priority among 
interests in real property is determined by the order of recording); Wilson v. Schne iter's 
Riverside Golf Course, 523 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1974). 
This Court has long recognized "[t]he salutariness of [Utah's] recording statute is 
that it provides stability and certainty to land titles" upon which parties must be able to 
rely. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 839 (Utah 1988). Since 
Pioneer's Trust Deeds admittedly and indisputably were recorded before any of the Filing 
Defendants recorded any documents evidencing any claim or interest by any of them in 
the Property, as a matter of law pursuant to Utah's recording statute Pioneer's Trust 
Deeds are superior to the interests of each and all of the Defendants. 
The District Court, however, departed from the record notice priority system 
established by Utah's recording statute, and held that Pioneer had "inquiry notice" of the 
Defendants' various claimed, but admittedly unrecorded, interests in various portions of 
the Property, and that Pioneer's Trust Deeds were junior and subordinate in priority to 
some (but not all) of the Filing Defendants'interests. 
The doctrine of inquiry notice has been recognized in Utah case law. It is, 
however, a rare exception to the general rule of record notice under Utah's recording 
statute. This Court has held that a duty to inquire beyond the records of the county 
recorder's office arises only "when circumstances arise that should put a reasonable 
person on notice so as to require further inquiry on his part." Id. at 838. It is well-settled 
that facts and circumstances that are not inconsistent with or adverse to what appears in 
the documents of record do not put one on notice of any need to inquire further, and do 
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not give rise to or create any duty to inquire beyond the face of the record. See e.g., Patel 
v. Rupp, 195 B.R. 779, 783-84 (D. Utah 1996) (finding no inquiry notice of unrecorded 
interest where use of the property was not inconsistent with or adverse to recorded 
interest); In re Granada, Inc., 92 B.R. 501, 506 (D. Utah 1988) (rejecting argument of 
claimed duty to inquire beyond the record title where use of property was not inconsistent 
*• 
with what one would expect to see); see also generally PATTON AND PALOMAR ON LAND 
TITLES § 12 (3d ed 2005) ("for possession to afford notice of an unrecorded interest, 
enough inconsistency must exist between the possession and the record to raise a 
question in the mind of anyone having a transaction with the holder of the record title.'9). , 
A use of property that is expected or consistent with what one would expect to find on a 
given parcel as a matter of law defeats any inquiry notice argument. See e.g., Stumph v. 
I 
Church, 740 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1987) (finding lender had no duty to inquire beyond 
the record title as to identity of owner prior to closing of non-owner occupied loan; fact 
that occupants of home at time of inspection were not the record owners was consistent ' 
with what was expected). 
None of the facts noted by the District Court were out of the ordinary with respect 
i 
to a subdivision style property like the RV park Property in this case, nor would they 
arouse any suspicion of any reasonable person to inquire beyond the recorded documents 
to search out any hypothetically possible claimants with unrecorded interests. The 
District Court noted, for example, that the Property had been drawn out essentially as a 
subdivision of numerous RV pads and campsites and a plat of them had been recorded, < 
there were Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of a members' association recorded, and 
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there were various leasehold claims and related interests of various people also recorded 
in the Rich County Recorder's Office. It also held (based on disputed facts, which is the 
subject of Argument II below) that some people had made certain use of and 
improvements to their respective RV pad sites within the Property before various of 
Pioneer's Trust Deeds were recorded. The District Court held those claimed facts gave 
rise to a legal duty of lenders like Pioneer to inquire further than the documents of record 
in the county recorder's office to determine who else may own or claim any unrecorded 
interests in the subject property. 
The District Court's ruling that documents recorded to dedicate the Property as an 
RV park, the recorded plat of the RV park, and various recorded leases on various of the 
RV sites (none of which are the Filing Defendants' leases on their claimed RV sites) 
somehow give rise to a legal duty of lenders like Pioneer to inquire further than and 
outside the documents of record to determine who else may own or claim any interests in 
the other RV parks or lots within the Property development not reflected in the recorded 
documents is illogical and unsustainable. It would turn the real estate secured lending 
industry on its head. Such items are not inconsistent with what one would expect to see 
in regard to property like that at issue in this case. To the contrary, the facts showed 
exactly what one would expect to see with respect to any similar subdivision - a general 
development, various lots (RV sites) with respect to which lessees had recorded their 
claims and interests, and other lots (RV sites) that appeared of record not to have yet been 
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leased. The existence of prior recorded leases on some RV sites, however, does not give 
notice of or signal the existence of unrecorded leases on other sites, as Defendants' 
argument claims. Even the claimed use or occupancy, and the claimed existence of 
certain improvements, on various lots and not on others, is precisely what one would 
expect to see with respect to any similar subdivision development, and is consistent with 
the record which included recorded leasehold interests on some RV sites, but not others. 
The facts and circumstances of this case simply, and as a matter of law, do not give rise 
to any duty to inquire beyond the records of the Rich County Recorder's Office. 
This case is the first of which the undersigned is aware to come before Utah's 
appellate courts addressing the applicability of the inquiry notice doctrine in favor of 
claimants to individual pads, lots, or units within a larger subdivided development tract, 
as against the beneficiary of a blanket trust deed upon the entire development tract. The 
case of In re Granada, Inc., 92 B.R. 501 (D. Utah 1988) is highly instructive to this case. 
In Granada, the bankruptcy court dealt with an inquiry notice claim under Utah law. The 
property at issue in Granada was a mobile home park, very similar to the property at 
issue in this case which is an RV park. Like the Defendants in the case at bar, the party 
claiming inquiry notice in Granada argued that portions of the property there at issue had 
been leased to tenants, who were in open occupancy and possession of their leased 
parcels. The party claiming inquiry notice in that case argued "where property is in the 
2
 Significantly, as the District Court itself noted "[s]everal leasehold interests (virtually 
identical interests to those of the other [defendants], except on different Lots) were 
recorded prior to the recording of the Pioneer trust deeds. (Initial Decision, at f 4 (R. 
4369), included in Addendum 1 hereto.) The owners of those leases recorded prior to the 
Pioneer Trust Deed are not named as Defendants." 
4850-4696-9353 ^O 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
possession of tenants, a purchaser must inquire about the identity of the landlord." Id. at 
506. Noting that "there is nothing that an inspection would have produced which was 
inconsistent with record title," the Granada Court firmly rejected that argument. Id. In 
language directly applicable to the case at bar, that court explained: 
we are unable to conclude that in 1988 tenants in possession of a mobile 
home park developed for that express purpose is sufficiently alarming so as 
to put a purchaser on constructive inquiry notice. [Id.]. 
Likewise, applied to the case at bar, occupancy and possession by various lessees 
of an RV park developed for that express purpose simply is not sufficiently alarming so 
as to put Pioneer on constructive inquiry notice to inquire beyond the record for holders 
of unrecorded interests. Accordingly, even if the facts noted by the District Court were1 
undisputed, they would prove only use of the subject property as a recreational vehicle 
park, which is precisely what the subject Property was being developed to be. As a 
matter of law, therefore, such facts simply did not give rise to any duty to inquire about 
unrecorded interests in the property and the District Court may not impose any duty to 
inquire beyond the record for, nor any purported "inquiry notice" of, any of the Filing 
Defendants' unrecorded claims to any of the Property. The District Court erred in ruling 
Pioneer was subject to inquiry notice. 
If the District Court's ruling in this case were the law, then there would never be 
any way that any lender could ever be assured regarding the priority of any lien, 
particularly on development or subdivision property like is at issue in this case. Any 
recording or use by any person on any part of a tract of property, under the District 
Court's ruling, would require lenders to conduct unspecified inquiries beyond, and indeed 
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despite the record title as to every conceivable claimant to every separate part, parcel, and 
portion of the overall development property to be used as security for a loan. Even then a 
lender still could not be certain some other unidentified claimant of some unrecorded 
interest was not still out there. 
The District Court's inquiry notice ruling would provide an exception to the 
recording statute that would swallow the rule of statutory record notice priority. It would 
allow parties to ignore the recording statute entirely, and shift the burden to lenders to 
protect them by requiring lenders to somehow divine the possible existence of those 
parties' non-record interests, at the lender's substantial peril, even where there is nothing 
out of the ordinary to signal the presence of any unrecorded interest. It is precisely the 
quagmire such a rule would create that the recording statute is designed to avoid. 
i 
Recording in compliance with Utah's statutes creates an objective and verifiable means 
of perfecting and searching for claims and interests in real property upon which to base 
informed and prudent lending and other decisions. See First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. * 
Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 839 (Utah 1988) (recognizing "[t]he salutariness of [Utah's] 
recording statute is that is provides stability and certainty to land titles.") This Court 
therefore should reverse the District Court's inquiry notice rulings and apply the rule of 
statutory record notice priority to all parties' claims and interests in this case and declare, 
as a matter of law, that Pioneer's Trust Deeds are ahead of and superior to the claimed 
interests of all of the Defendants in this case that indisputably were recorded (if ever) 
after Pioneer's Trust Deeds. < 
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II. DISPUTES OF MATERIAL FACT FURTHER PRECLUDED THE 
DISTRICT COURT FROM GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
DEFENDANTS' INQUIRY NOTICE THEORY 
The District Court further erred in application of inquiry notice on summary 
judgment because there were disputes of material facts claimed by Defendants and relied 
upon by the District Court in support of imposing the duty of inquiry notice. 
It is well-settled that summary judgment can be granted only if "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact" and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. P. "[A] motion for summary judgment should be 
denied where the evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact." Jackson v. Dabney, 
645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). It is well-settled that "'[o]ne sworn statement under oath 
[involving a material fact] is all that is necessary to create a factual issue, thereby 
precluding summary judgment.'" Nyman v. McDonald, 966 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) (quoting Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989)) (alteration in original). In proceedings on a motion for summary judgment, all 
facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
E.g., Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1997). Also, all facts 
asserted in opposition to the Filing Defendants' Cross-Motion must be taken as 
established for the purposes of these proceedings. E.g., Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 
1332, 1334-35 (Utah 1977). 
These disputes of fact do not affect Pioneer's entitlement to judgment of priority as a 
matter of law, however, since Pioneer's priority is based on a faithful adherence to the 
long-settled statutory recording system and the indisputable record notice priority of 
Pioneer's Trust Deeds. 
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A major part of the Filing Defendants' inquiry notice argument and the District 
Court's inquiry notice analysis related to various claimed uses of and improvements 
purportedly made to various of the Filing Defendants'RV sites. 
The District Court held that several Filing Defendants have on various RV sites 
made or installed storage sheds, fire pits, rock walls, stairs, fences, landscaping, lawns, 
flowers, trees, gardens, family signs, patio furniture, sprinklers, water hookups, utility 
meters, cement pads, gravel driveways, and parked RVs. Filing Defendants argued and 
the District Court ruled that Ralph Call, president of Pioneer, had actual knowledge of 
those claimed improvements to numerous lots from a visit he made to the Property in 
April of 2001. That purported actual knowledge is material and necessary to the District 
Court's inquiry notice ruling, because as a matter of law a duty to inquire further from 
facts outside of recorded documents can arise only if the party has actual knowledge of 
the non-record facts. See e.g., First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 
837-839 (Utah 1998). Pioneer, however, disputed the existence of the purported 
improvements claimed by the Filings Defendants, and disputed any actual knowledge of 
Ralph Call relating to such claimed improvements. Rather than all of the improvements 
claimed by the Filing Defendants, and noted by the District Court, when Ralph Call 
visited the site in April 2001 he stated in his sworn affidavit that "[a]t most there were 
four or five recreational vehicle camper trailers parked in various spots [,] a few concrete 
slabs in scattered places[,] a lodge on the property, and some small, narrow roads." (Call 
Affidavit, Tf 8 (R. 4250, Addendum 15 hereto.) The District Court itself expressly 
acknowledged "Plaintiff disputes that it had inquiry notice of the existence of the 
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purported improvements and disputed any actual knowledge of these claimed 
improvements." (Initial Decision at R. 4381 (emphasis added), Addendum 1 hereto.) It 
was inappropriate for the District Court to grant summary judgment for Defendants over 
these disputed facts. 
The District Court also relied heavily for its inquiry notice ruling on the claim that 
Pioneer's principal, Ralph Call, had received and read a certain appraisal report 
pertaining to the Property before Pioneer made any of its loans that are the subject of this 
case. Since the full appraisal report allegedly included a lengthy and detailed discussion 
of various claims and interests in the Property, the District Court reasoned that Pioneer 
had actual knowledge of, and therefore a duty to inquire regarding, all unrecorded 
interests in the property. Those claims are disputed even on the fact of the appraisal 
report itself, and are further disputed by the sworn Call Affidavit and the sworn Baugh 
Affidavit (Addenda 15 and 16, respectively). To begin with, on its face the appraisal is 
dated December 29, 2000, more than a month after Pioneer's first loan was made. 
Moreover, the sworn affidavits of Call and Baugh confirmed that when Baugh received 
the appraisal, sometime after December 29, 2000, he forwarded to Call only two pages of 
it, without all of the lease information and other detail the District Court relied upon in its 
inquiry notice analysis. The claimed receipt and review of the referenced appraisal report 
and related information therefore also are disputed material facts, which further precluded 
summary judgment for the Filing Defendants. 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT ALSO ERRED IN HANDLING THE 
REMAINING ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. The Deeds to the Grantors of Pioneer's Trust Deeds Expressly Were 
Subject to Only Certain Interests "Of Record." 
As a part of its inquiry notice analysis, the District Court's January 2009 Judgment 
and Order stated, "Plaintiff obtained its trust deed interests in the Property subject to the 
restrictions appearing in the owners' warranty deed restrictions, including making the 
interests "[s]ubject to a l l . . . easements, declarations, agreements, memberships [and] 
leases " fl[ 13.d. (R. 5422) (emphasis added).) The implication is that the District 
Court imposed a duty to inquire beyond the record because Pioneer's own chain of title 
was "subject to" various interests which could include, under that language, unrecorded 
interests. The District Court's analysis, however, fails to take account of the full "subject 
to" clause of those deeds. In their entirety, those clauses actually state that the 
conveyances to Pioneer's Trust Deed grantors are: 
Subject to all declarations, covenants, conditions and restrictions, 
certificate of beneficial use, regulations, canals, greenbelt provisions, 
easements, declarations, agreements, memberships, leases and rights of 
way of record. 
(R. 3016 and 4178, Addenda 10 and 11, respectively (emphasis added). 
Since Defendants' claims and interests were not "of record" when the deeds to the 
trustors of Pioneer's Trust Deeds were recorded, those deeds and Pioneer's Trust Deeds 
are not subject to Defendants' non-record claims and interests.4 Deed references to what 
4
 In its Initial Decision, the District Court makes note of the full language of the "subject 
to" clauses of the deeds. (Initial Decision fflf 14 and 24 at R. 4372-4374, Addendum 1.) 
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is "of record" certainly do not give notice of, or require inquiry regarding, claims or 
interests that are not "of record." Accordingly, nothing in the recorded deeds' language 
supports imposition of a duty of inquiry outside of the record. 
B. The District Court Erred in Its Handling of Parcel -025, Including 
Regarding the Corrective Affidavit and After-Acquired Title. 
The District Court failed to properly account in its inquiry notice analysis for the 
legal effect of Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed, Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed, the 
Corrective Affidavit, and the Settlement Deed. The District Court ruled that prior to the 
recording of the Corrective Affidavit, "Plaintiff failed to record parcel -025 in its 
Modified Pioneer Trust Deed filing. After the failure to include parcel -025, 
improvements were made to lots in parcel -025 between the time the leaseholds were 
purchased (which were after the Modified Pioneer Trust Deed was recorded and the time 
of the correction filing," and Plaintiffs Modified Pioneer Trust Deed filing and 
corrective filing fails to put Plaintiff in a superior position to [Filing] Defendants." 
(Initial Decision, at R. 4384-4385, Addendum 1 hereto). 
Those rulings, however, are erroneous, both factually and legally. Factually, as 
the District Court itself actually had already acknowledged earlier in its Initial Decision 
(and later confirmed in its January 2009 Judgment and Order), the face of Pioneer's 
Modified Trust Deed itself expressly does include, identify, and list Parcel -025 among 
the Property affected by it. Moreover, the Court failed to even address in its analysis that 
Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed in any event also indisputably expressly included, 
But the District Court confused other language in the "subject to" clauses and never even 
addressed the express and critical "of record" qualifier. Id. 
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identified, and listed Parcel -025 among the Property affected by it, which the District 
Court also acknowledged. (Initial Decision, ^ 33.a., at R. 4375 - 4376; Pioneer's 
Modified Trust Deed, Addendum 6 hereto). There were, therefore two of Pioneer's Trust 
Deeds recorded on August 14, 2001, identifying and describing Parcel -025 as being 
covered and encumbered by them. 
Legally, the District Court erred in failing to recognize the record notice priority of 
Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed as to Parcel 
-025 as of the date they were recorded, irrespective of any Corrective Affidavit. The 
indisputable fact that both Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental 
Trust Deed were recorded on August 14, 2001, each identifying and describing Parcel 
-025 as among the Property encumbered by them means that the Filing Defendants, as a 
matter of law pursuant to Utah's recording statute, were on constructive record notice of 
Pioneer's claim to an interest in and encumbrance upon the Property, including Parcel 
-025. The fact that the deed to the grantor of Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and 
Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed, as recorded, did not have Parcel -025 in its attached 
legal description is of no moment. Pursuant to Utah's recording statute, once Pioneer's 
Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed were recorded with Parcel -
025 included and described within them, as a matter of law they gave constructive notice 
to all the world of their contents, including their containing a description of and their 
claim of an interest in and encumbrance upon Parcel -025. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-
102(1) (2005) ("Each document... shall, from the time of recording with the appropriate 
county recorder, impact notice to all persons of their contents."). Accordingly, even if 
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the grantor of Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed did 
not actually own Parcel -025 when it signed those trust deeds, the recording of those trust 
deeds still, as a matter of law, put Filing Defendants and all the world on notice of 
Pioneer's claim to an interest in Parcel -025. The Corrective Affidavit expressly 
remedied any oversight or clerical error in the mistaken exclusion of Parcel -025 from the 
legal description page attached to and recorded with the deed to the grantor of Pioneer's 
Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed.5 Even without that, 
however, Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed 
themselves, as a matter of record and of law, placed the world on notice of Pioneer's 
claim to and encumbrance upon Parcel-025. 
In any event, the Settlement Deed definitively and indisputably rendered Parcel 
5
 The District Court erred in ruling the Corrective Affidavit "is a nullity, is not 
retroactive, and does not meet the requirements of § 57-3-106(8) UCA." (January 2009 
Judgment and Order, % 13.e., at R.5422, included in Addendum No. 4). The Corrective 
Affidavit expressly states that Parcel -025 "was included in the transaction between the 
parties ... and should have been included in the legal description attached to" the deed to 
Pine Ridge. (Addendum No. 12). Even the Budd Parties themselves pointed out, and the 
District Court itself ruled, the relevant Purchase and Sale Agreement shows that Parcel 
-025 was indeed intended to be conveyed to the grantor of Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed 
and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed. Corrections by affidavit of such clerical errors 
as the mistaken attachment of the wrong legal description attachment to a document are 
expressly allowed by Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-106(8) (2006) ("Minor typographical or 
clerical errors in a document of record may be corrected by the recording of an affidavit 
or other appropriate instrument.") (emphasis added). Given the above facts with regard 
to the intended inclusion of Parcel -025 in the deed to the grantor of Pioneer's Modified 
and Supplemental Trust Deeds, as a matter of law, the Corrective Affidavit fixed the 
clerical error by which the legal description of Parcel -025 was mistakenly not attached to 
the conveyance deed, correcting and confirming as a matter of record and of law that 
Parcel -025 was indeed conveyed. 
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-025 validly and effectively covered and encumbered by Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed 
and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed, as if Parcel -025 was vested of record in the 
grantor at the time it executed those trust deeds. The Settlement Deed that was recorded 
on March 14, 2005 (Addendum 13). Pursuant to the after-acquired title doctrine, which 
has been statutorily codified in Utah, that conveyance automatically and as a matter of 
law is deemed effective to include Parcel -025 "as security for the obligation or 
obligations for which [Parcel -025] is conveyed as if acquired before execution of the 
trust deed." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-20 (2006) (emphasis added). As a matter of 
statutory law, therefore, even if the grantor did not own Parcel -025 when it signed 
Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed that each 
included Parcel -025 in their legal descriptions of the property encumbered by those trust 
deeds, by virtue of the later and admitted Settlement Deed conveyance of Parcel -025 to 
that grantor, those Pioneer trust deeds indisputably attached to and encumbered Parcel -
025, as a matter of law, retroactive to the date they were recorded "as i f Parcel -025 was 
acquired and owned by that grantor at the time it executed those trust deeds. Pioneer's 
Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed, both recorded on August 
14, 2001, are both prior and superior to all of the Filing Defendants' interests since they 
indisputably were not recorded until after Pioneer's Modified Trust Deed and Pioneer's 
Supplemental Trust Deed, if at all. The District Court, however, failed to take any 
account at all of the Settlement Deed. 
The District Court failed to properly construe and account for the Pioneer's 
Modified Trust Deed, Pioneer's Supplemental Trust Deed, the Corrective Affidavit, the 
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Settlement Deed, and each of the statutes discussed above in this section. Each of those 
failures contributed to the ultimate erroneous ruling imposing a duty of inquiry beyond 
the record and granting inquiry notice priority for the Filing Defendants. This Court 
should reverse the District Court on each of these above-noted points, and reverse the 
District Court's resulting erroneous ruling as to the priority of Filing Defendants' 
interests. 
C. The District Court Erred in Granting Priority to Claimants in the 
Payment Lots Contrary to Their Governing Contract Language and 
Sworn Admissions. 
The claimants to the Payment Lots each admitted under oath in their sworn 
deposition testimony that they have not paid in fall their respective contracts to obtain 
their respective claimed interests in the various Payment Lots. Accordingly, pursuant to 
the express language of their own contracts clearly, expressly, and indisputably stating 
they shall receive their interests in those lots only "when contract is paid in fall," the 
claimants to the Payment Lots are not yet even entitled to receive any ownership or other 
interest in any of the Payments Lots. Moreover, even if and when those claimants ever 
do pay off their contracts, any interests they may obtain under those contracts always was 
and will always be and remain junior and inferior in priority to, and subject to the Pioneer 
Trust Deeds in any event because the Pioneer's Trust Deeds all are already recorded and 
encumber whatever interest may ultimately eventually be granted to those claimants. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102(1) (2009) ("Each document... shall, from the time of 
recording with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of their 
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contents"); id. § 57-3-103(2) (assigning priority among competing property claims to that 
which is evidenced by the "document [that] is first duly recorded"). 
As a matter of law, Pioneer's recorded Trust Deeds are prior and superior to any 
interest of the claimants to the Payment Lots who have never paid those contracts to 
actually become entitled receive or obtain any interest in those lots, and who had not 
recorded any document pertaining to their claimed interests in the Payment Lots before 
the recording of Pioneer's Trust Deeds. This Court should therefore reverse the District 
Court's August 2010 Judgment on Payment Lots and declare the Pioneer Trust Deeds 
prior and superior as a matter of law to the claimed interests of the claimants to those lots, 
and allow Pioneer to complete the foreclosure of the Pioneer Trust Deeds including as 
against the Payment Lots. 
D. Filing Defendants' References to Insurance Were Impermissible, 
Prejudicial and Support Reversal. 
The Filing Defendants' references to the possible availability of title insurance for 
Pioneer is unavailing to them on their inquiry notice theories, and was prejudicial to 
Pioneer and is therefore a further basis for reversal of the District Court's ruling. The 
Anderson Defendants mentioned the availability of a title policy, and the Budd 
Defendants expressly argued that Pioneer's recourse in this case would be a claim on that 
policy to the company who insured the Property. 
The collateral source rule bars courts from considering the existence of possible 
payments to a party from external sources, like insurance, in analyzing and evaluating the 
parties' rights and the merits of claims in a case. See e.g., Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. v. U.S. 
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Fidelity & Guar. Co., 949 P.2d 337, 345 (Utah 1997). Whether or not any Pioneer title 
insurance policy ultimately might cover any losses that might be suffered by Pioneer 
were not able to foreclose as against the Filing Defendants based on the record notice 
priority of Pioneer's Trust Deeds, is speculative and in any event is irrelevant and 
immaterial to determining the respective rights and priorities between Pioneer and the 
Filing Defendants. Pioneer maintains the insurance references and arguments account for 
the District Court's erratic and inconsistent self reversals in applying record notice at 
various times and inquiry notice at other times as it attempted to craft an outcome, taking 
into account potential insurance coverage against some of its rulings. The Filing 
Defendants' arguments and evidence of possible title insurance coverage, however, were 
improper and inadmissible in this case, including in the summary judgment proceedings. 
See e.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Utah R. Evid. 401, 402, & 403. Pioneer's objections to 
and motion to strike the references to title insurance issued to Pioneer went unheeded. 
Those insurance references and arguments by the Filing Defendants were prejudicial and 
support reversal of the District Court's rulings in favor of the Filing Defendants. 
IV. PIONEER SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS FEES AND COSTS INCURRED 
ON APPEAL 
Pioneer is entitled to recover its attorneys' fees and costs on appeal. The 
promissory notes for which Pioneer's Trust Deeds serve as security each provide that 
Pioneer is entitled to recover all costs and expenses of collection, including reasonable 
attorney fees. This Court, therefore, should award to Pioneer its attorney fees incurred on 
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appeal, including as a part of the amount for which it may foreclose Pioneer's Trust 
Deeds as against each and all of the defendants herein. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the District court's rulings applying the inquiry notice 
theory of priority instead of the rule of statutory record notice priority that should govern 
this case. The District Court's decision granting priority to the interests of Defendants on 
summary judgment based on inquiry notice was unsustainable on the facts of this case, 
and particularly on summary judgment in light of disputes of facts material to the inquiry 
notice theory. 
By contrast, Pioneer's Trust Deeds indisputably were recorded prior to any 
interests of any of the Defendants to any part of the subject Property. As a matter of 
express statutory law, therefore, pursuant to Utah's recording statutes Pioneer's Trust 
Deeds are superior to the interests of all Defendants.. This Court should therefore reverse 
the District Court, apply record notice priority to all Defendants, and allow Pioneer to 
foreclose its Trust Deeds as prior and superior to all interests of all Defendants in and to 
any and all parts of and interests in the Property. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of May, 2011. 
FABIAN & CLEM)ENIN, PC 
Attorneys for Inaintiff/Appellant Pioneer 
Builders Company of Nevada, Inc. 
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Brent K. Wamsley 
Wamsley & Associates, L.C. 
4360 South Redwood Road, Suite 1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123-2204 
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Logan, Utah 84321 
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Glaser, Laurie A. Glaser, Lenard Hanzlick, KathrynJ. Hanzlick, 
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